Socio-Legal Review
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 6

September 2022

Critical International Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism and
Transnationalism (Prabhakar Singh and Benoit Mayer eds., 2014)
Ashwita Ambast

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr

Recommended Citation
Ambast, Ashwita (2022) "Critical International Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism and Transnationalism
(Prabhakar Singh and Benoit Mayer eds., 2014)," Socio-Legal Review: Vol. 11: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/slr/vol11/iss1/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Socio-Legal Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact library@nls.ac.in.

Vol. 11(1)

Socio-Legal Review

2015

BOOK REVIEW
CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: POSTREALISM,
POSTCOLONIALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM1
(Prabhakar Singh & Benoît Mayer eds., 2014)
Ashwita Ambast*
The lack of concerted methodological critique is a significant failing of international
law scholarship. Critical international lawyers (“the Crits”) aim to question and
destabilize the inaccurate assumptions behind international law, which have slowly
become deeply entrenched as truths.2 The Crits believe in the “absence of a central
international legal order as an impartial point to which state actors can refer” and
in a “mature anarchy in international relations (and) the recognition of states as
independent centres of legal culture and significance…”3
In Critical International Law, Prabhakar Singh and Benoît Mayer bring together
different scholars of this post modern tradition who carefully re-envision
international law as it stands today. The scholars address three areas that have
been systematically neglected in mainstream international law discourse and
writing, and thus remain unexplored; post-realism, post-colonialism, and
transnationalism.
This review will begin with an overview of the articles in the Critical International
Law. Subsequently, this review will raise three points of analysis: internal
differences in opinions in the book, the role of international law scholars, and the
scope of the premise of the book.
1
*
2

3

CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: POSTREALISM, POSTCOLONIALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM
(Prabhakar Singh & Benoît Mayer eds., 2014) [hereinafter “CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW”].
Ashwita Ambast is a Graduate of National Law School of India University, Bangalore and Yale
Law School.
For an interesting overview and explanation of what is critical about critical international law,
the Afterword to the book is a valuable read: Sébastien Jodoin and Katharine Lofts, What’s
Critical about Critical International Law?, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at
326.
Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law,
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/2/1/2026.pdf.
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POST-REALISM
Post-realism explores the relationship between international law and international
politics.4 The contributions recognise that the international legal order is no longer
state-centric; rather, international law is a process of authoritative decision making
that need not necessarily stem from the state, and that must, hence, accounts for
rules, policies as well as individual state context.5 Thus, Rossana Deplano criticises
the welfarist approach,6 which argues that “states are the primary actors of
international law and bear the responsibility to enter global, welfare maximizing
agreements with other states on behalf of their population.”7
However, despite states taking a backseat, the international order remains governed
by prevailing power relations in interesting, new ways. John Morss argues that
international law has failed to properly address time and power.8 For instance, at
its inception, Israel did not strictly conform to the Montevideo requirements of
statehood but in an interesting interplay of power and time, overwhelming
recognition from other states (supplemented by military, economic and political
support) became self fulfilling.9 Similarly, it is argued that the recognition received
by Kosovo from other nations after its unilateral declaration of independence
gave the Kosovar state otherwise absent legitimacy in the eyes of international
law.10 Further, lopsided power relations even impact secondary sources of
international law. The powers of modern international tribunals extend far beyond
the mere settlement of disputes.11 However, not all states readily internalise
international law, given that the decisions of international courts and tribunals
are self referential, often not pro-public, and tend to discriminate between states
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Prabhakar Singh & Benoît Mayer, Introduction, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 1, 5.
Rossana Deplano, The Welfarist Approach to International Law, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 1, at 74, 87.
This approach is championed by Eric Posner: Eric Posner, International Law: A Welfarist
Approach , 73 U. CHIC. L. REV. 487 (2006).
Rossana Deplano, CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 75-77.
John R. Morss, The Riddle of the Sands, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 53-55.
Morss says that historical change is articulated by international law in paradoxical ways.
Id.
Daniel Fierstein, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of Legality, Policy
and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J., 417 (2009).
Prabhakar Singh, Revisiting the Role of International Courts and Tribunals, in C RITICAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 98, 100.
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based on region.12 Even the work of highly influential publicists is mired in
competition for persuasiveness, with Western nations retaining stronghold over
the manufacturing of international law.13
The resonating lesson of the first segment is to re-imagine the international order
while taking into account power relations. The New Haven School’s policy
oriented approach to international law14 is one such approach that views
international law as being “rule by diplomacy”. Although it is believed that the
New Haven School tends to fetishize the role of realpolitik, it is true that “the
analysis of power within international law, from an international law perspective
– rather than the perspective of another discipline, be it ethics, political science, or
international relations – is overdue”.15

POST-COLONIALISM
In the ‘Postcolonialism’ segment, it is argued that international law is complicit in
concealing and legitimizing imperialism.16 The creation of equal states is at the
heart of international law; yet, non-European colonized states were not considered
equal at all.17 These states were denied sovereignty by Western powers and on
gaining political independence, remain marginalized. The failure of the ‘New
International Economic Order’,18 and the coercive influence of Western dominated
international institutions like the International Monetary Fund are signs of neoeconomic imperialism. Anghie calls for an alternate analytic framework, a ‘dynamic
of difference’, directed at studying how international law relates to colonialism,19

12

13
14

15
16
17
18
19

Prabhakar Singh, Revisiting the Role of International Courts and Tribunals, in C RITICAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 113-114, 117. Singh takes the example of international
investment law decisions that are overwhelmingly pro-private and discriminatory.
Singh, supra note 15, at 118.
For more details on the collaboration between Profs. Lasswell and McDougal, see, O. Hathaway,
The Continuing Influence of the New Haven School, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, PAPER 834,
(2007), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/834.
John R. Morss, The Riddle of the Sands, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 53, 65.
Antony Anghie, Towards a Postcolonial International Law, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 123.
Antony Anghie, Towards a Postcolonial International Law, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 123, 129.
By which developing countries sought to assert control over their natural resources.
Antony Anghie, Towards a Postcolonial International Law, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 123, 130.
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and which approaches international law as a problem of order between different
cultures.20
Human rights historiography is symptomatic of Anghie’s observations. The
existing human rights historiography is Eurocentric,21 fallaciously placing the crisis
of modernity at the Holocaust22 when the crisis of modernity in reality began at
its birth. Rationalism, modernism and the accumulation of wealth have consistently
bred a dark side of slavery, genocide and dispossession.23 Evidence of the crisis of
modernity that do not find a place in modern historiography include the conquest
of America,24 the genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda and Bosnia that challenge the
consequence of the UDHR and the wide exploitation and violence perpetrated in
colonies.25 To attain universal appeal, “human rights need to be located in a wider
historical and geopolitical context”, and be recontexualised to include five centuries
of colonial genocide.26 Upendra Baxi27 has proposed an alternative historiography:
Human rights are not a gift from the West. Baxi proposes a history from below
where the original authors of history are people in struggles.28 Baxi thus aims to
close the “yawning gap” between theory and activism.29 Toufayan believes that

20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27
28
29

Antony Anghie, Towards a Postcolonial International Law, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 123, 134.
José-Manuel Barreto, A Universal History of Infamy, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 143.
José-Manuel Barreto, A Universal History of Infamy, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 143, 147.
José-Manuel Barreto, A Universal History of Infamy, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 143, 156, 163.
José-Manuel Barreto, A Universal History of Infamy, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 143, 154. Barreto substantiated this with Marx’s example of the primitive accumulation
of capital. José-Manuel Barreto, A Universal History of Infamy, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 143,163.
José-Manuel Barreto, A Universal History of Infamy, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 143, 149-151.
José-Manuel Barreto, A Universal History of Infamy, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 143, 166.
Mark Toufayan, Suffering the Paradox of Rights?, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 167, 175.
Mark Toufayan, Suffering the Paradox of Rights?, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 167, 174.
Mark Toufayan, Suffering the Paradox of Rights?, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 167, 169-170.
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Baxi’s work falls short methodologically, specifically in explaining how to make
human suffering legible in discussions about international human rights.30
The lopsided narrative has limited access to human rights to a select few by the
installation of personal and geographical limitations.31 ‘Big’ states have disclaimed
responsibility for external actions by using strategies such as offshoring human
rights violations, as in the case of Guantanamo Bay,32 using the lack of citizenship
to limit the rights available to victims as in Hamdi,33 and by exploiting the need
for establishing ‘effective control’ as required by Bankovic.34 To be sure, the ‘Magic
Circle’ of rights is expanding. The enforceability of international human rights
law against a state has moved from being predicated on nationality and allegiance
or territory and ‘jurisdiction’, to the more modern “power and authority” test.35
Milanovic has proposed a more extensive test, whereby states are required to
ensure negative rights to all individuals and positive rights to those within their
effective control.36 However, Mayer makes the case for the absence of any
conditionalities on the applicability of human rights.37

30

31
32
33
34
35

36
37

Mark Toufayan, Suffering the Paradox of Rights?, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 167, 183. Not only is Baxi equivocal about the politics of the historian’s use of past human
suffering for the future of human rights, he is also unable to justify whether the grassroots voice
is relevant to human rights decisionmaking. Moreover, left unaddressed are the methodological
dangers of a history from below which can include issues of agency, representation and the
creeping in of unwarranted assumptions and omissions. Mark Toufayan, Suffering the Paradox
of Rights?, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 167, 184.
Benoît Mayer, The Magic Circle of Rights Holders, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
1, at 198, 199.
Benoît Mayer, The Magic Circle of Rights Holders, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 198, 206.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); Benoît Mayer, The Magic Circle of Rights Holders,
in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 198, 203.
Bankovic v. Belgium 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 890; Benoît Mayer, The Magic Circle of Rights
Holders, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 198, 210.
Benoît Mayer, The Magic Circle of Rights Holders, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
1, at 198, 202, 207: The power and authority test includes cases where a state has de facto and de
jure control over an event.
Benoît Mayer, The Magic Circle of Rights Holders, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 198, 215.
Benoît Mayer, The Magic Circle of Rights Holders, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 198, 216.
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TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Judge Philip Jessup characterised transnational law being as “all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers…[including] [b]oth public and
private international law…[plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into standard
categories.”38
The growth of a self-sufficient system of adjudication of international investment
law is a product of transnationalism. Uruena explains that although arbitral awards
do not bind later tribunals, precedent is widely used in international investment
law.39 To explain the legitimacy of this system, Uruena likens it to a model of
global governance where collective expertise is introduced to remedy the failure
of municipal laws to protect the interests of investors.40 Prior investment awards
are the only reliable source of remedying this failing.41 Thus, the legitimacy of the
system derives not from state sovereignty, but from principles of global governance.
Similarly, while conventionally, human rights obligations derive from state consent,
a transnational framework also allows for the creation of new entitlements by
placing reliance on novel sources. The human right to water does not constitute a
positive international law, as custom is silent and conventions only call for
progressive realization.42 Owen McIntyre states that the rights and obligations of
actors such as individuals, corporations, vulnerable communities, investors, and
state agencies can be garnered from transnational regulations using the Global
Administrative Law framework, akin to administrative law questions.43 Closer
study reveals that the principles relating to universal access to water as articulated
38

39
40
41
42
43

Harold Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 745 (2006). To
borrow Prof. Harold Koh’s definition: “[t]ransnational law represents a hybrid of domestic and
international law that has assumed increasing significance in our lives.”
Rene Uruena, Of Precedents and Ideology, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 276,
280.
Rene Uruena, Of Precedents and Ideology, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 276,
293-301.
Rene Uruena, Of Precedents and Ideology, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 276,
301.
Owen McIntyre, The Human Right to Water as a ‘Creature’ of Global Administrative Law, in
CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 249, 259.
Owen McIntyre, The Human Right to Water as a ‘Creature’ of Global Administrative, in
CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 249, 250.
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by a variety of non-state actors and institutions reflect accountability, participation,
predictability, and transparency.44
Other non-conventional governance institutions are constantly posing challenges
to international law.45 How should modern international law be visualised? Should
a plural approach that appreciates non-state actors functioning as norm setting
agencies be taken, or should a state-centric constitutional approach be adopted?
As of now, there are no clear answers. The European Court of Human Rights in
Behrami46 took a constitutional approach by upholding the member states’
obligations under the United Nations resolution over European Union
obligations. On the other hand, in Kadi,47 a plural approach was taken, as the
European Court of Justice by providing judicial review over a Security Council
Resolution. Singh and Kubler conclude that both constitutionalism as well as
pluralism are necessary to maintain the delicate transnational fabric: the former
to “ensure the legitimacy of the international legal order in the face of
fragmentation” and the latter to “curtail the hegemonic intent that international
law’s makers…might have.”48
The tussle between the power of the state and that of new fangled international
institutions is also apparent in the development of the “international man”. An
international civil service comprising of individuals who owed allegiance only the
international order was first visualised when the League of Nations was established.49
However, the international man failed to materialise. Not only was the field far
from representative (positions were overwhelmingly filled by elite Anglo-Saxon
men)50, the vision of cultivating the fine balance between a strong international
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Owen McIntyre, The Human Right to Water as a ‘Creature’ of Global Administrative, in
CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 249, 257, 275.
Prabhakar Singh and Benoît Mayer, Introduction, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
1, at 1, 5.
Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway Joined App
Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01.
CFI Kadi Case T-315/01.
Prabhakar Singh and Sonja Kubler, Constitutionalism and Pluralism, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 1, at 304, 304.
Frédéric Megret, The Rise and Fall of International Man, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 223
Frédéric Megret, The Rise and Fall of International Man, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 223, 233.
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orientation with national foundations (“a rooted rootlessness”51) was hard to achieve.

SOME POINTS OF ANALYSIS
The contributions in Critical International Law are divided on a number of
subjects. Non-state actors are treated by McIntyre as being legitimate members of
global governance mechanisms with the capacity to create administrative norms.
Uruena paints a vivid picture of international investment arbitrations as being
legitimate, self referential systems created by non-state, ad hoc arbitral tribunals.
Singh, on the other hand, is more sceptical about self referring international courts
and tribunals and even authoritative publicists becoming agents of legitimacy as
he believes that there may not be “enough political will among states…to
transnationalize”.52 On occasion, these might even turn into opportunities for the
unwarranted exercise of private power,53 or for errant behaviour such as the
invention of international law particularly by dominant Western sovereigns.54
Thus, while one group of scholars sees legal pluralism and the growth of nonstate actors as a reality with benefits, others believe that when power imbalances
permeate to these non-state actors, there is cause for concern. Constitutionalism,
too, is a contested notion. The overwhelming approach of the authors is to question
the established system of international norms. Anghie’s postcolonial critique strikes
at the core of the system of international law itself, attacking its biased constitution.
However, Singh and Kubler’s contribution looks at the benefits of
constitutionalism as maintaining framework for the international legal order. By
and large, all contributions see value in the existence of an international legal
order. This emerges as a central challenge: reshaping the foundation of international
law while retaining its functionality.

51
52
53
54

Frédéric Megret, The Rise and Fall of International Man, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 1, at 223, 232.
Prabhakar Singh, Revisiting the Role of International Courts and Tribunals, in C RITICAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 98, 112.
Prabhakar Singh, Revisiting the Role of International Courts and Tribunals, in C RITICAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 98, 116.
Prabhakar Singh, Revisiting the Role of International Courts and Tribunals, in C RITICAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 98, 118.
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Interestingly, Critical International Law indicates a dynamic role for scholars as
bearing the ultimate burden of reforming the international order. Saberi
acknowledges the professional image of the international law as being a distinctive
contribution of the New Haven School.55 The international scholar is envisaged
as an activist lawyer “at the service of human dignity”56 who participates in different
phases of the legal process57 and influences perspectives by communicating
ideologies.58 Similarly, in an attempt to break Western hegemony in the realm of
highly acclaimed publications as a source of international law, Singh calls for all
nations to invest in their international law intelligentsia who may then create
scholarship from their national perspective that can influence the direction taken
by international law.59 Toufayan’s piece describes the ‘historiographical turn’ that
encompasses a “growing need on the part of international lawyers to review (even
to confirm) the history of international law and to establish links with the past
and present”.60 Thus, critical international law is raising the bar for international
law scholars by introducing new ethical dimensions to scholarly research. In
assessing whether international scholars are capable of performing this role, Saberi
cautions against the dangers of unconditional faith in a class of persons,61 and
alerts readers to the fact that questions of what kind of political behaviour can be
considered acceptable are subject to much political and historical debate that
international scholars may be unable to agree upon or to resolve.62 Perhaps the
potential of scholarship from different parts of the world to influence and correct
the prevailing vision of international law is for time to tell.

55
56
57

58
59
60

Hengameh Saberi, Descendents of Realism, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at
29, 52.
Hengameh Saberi, Descendents of Realism, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 29,
31.
Hengameh Saberi, Descendents of Realism, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 29,
42 including: intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation, application, termination,
and appraisal.
Hengameh Saberi, Descendents of Realism in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 29,
43.
Prabhakar Singh, Revisiting the Role of International Courts and Tribunals, in C RITICAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 98, 119.
Mark Toufayan, Suffering the Paradox of Rights?, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1,
at 167, 170.
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A prime criticism levied against the Crits has been that their critique is chiefly
deconstructive.63 Critical International Law aims to “reflect the many ways in
which critical scholars think about international law”.64 Is the premise of this
book too limited and should the book address the implementation of the paradigms
proposed by the Crits as well? While Anghie makes a strong point regarding the
manner in which imperialism has shaped and continues to shape international
law,65 he is silent on how this realisation can be utilized to impact current
international lawmaking. Can raising caution regarding the colonial overtones of
international law alter and inform international negotiations, decision-making or
the drafting of treaties? Can revealing the imperial proclivities of jurists66 adversely
affect the authority of their word on international law? What is the consequence
of Western powers acknowledging the historically lopsided nature of international
law and what amends can they make? On similar lines, while Barreto’s call for a
“recontexualization of human rights” is pressing and convincing, it is not
supplemented by the parameters of the recontextualization. Accounting for the
vast experience of colonialism is no small task, and is fraught with complex
methodological concerns. Further thought on who is responsible for
recontexualizing the history of international law, and how, would be welcome.
The Afterword also notes that the Crits have been accused of “remain[ing] at
arm’s length from the more practical concerns of their discipline”.67 While Morss
has a convincing critique of the paradoxical ways in which power is understood

61
62
63

64
65
66
67

Hengameh Saberi, Descendents of Realism, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at
29, 46.
Hengameh Saberi, Descendents of Realism, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at
29, 48.
The Afterword to Critical International Law notes that “[o]f particular concern is the failure of
many critical international scholars to effectively, explicitly reflect on what comes after their
structural critiques”. SébastienJodoin and Katharine Lofts, What’s Critical about Critical
International Law, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 326, 334.
Prabhakar Singh and BenoîtMayer, Introduction, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
1, at 1, 5.
Antony Anghie, Towards a Postcolonial International Law in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 123, 140.
Antony Anghie, Towards a Postcolonial International Law, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 123, 142.
Sébastien Jodoin and Katharine Lofts, What’s Critical about Critical International Law, in
CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 326, 334.
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in international law, the solution proposed is to ‘take apart’ statehood and selfdetermination and create a new account that will make legal sense of legitimacy.68
The effectuation of this solution is obscure. Can the genesis of states that were
contested at their inception be questioned today on theoretical grounds? If so,
what are the consequences of a historical case of self-determination being illegitimate
under the new paradigm of analysis?
As it stands, united by the loose common thread of “thinking critically”, and
approaching international law from three powerful vantage points, the novelty
and richness of perspectives presented in the compilation make Critical
International Law a compelling read.

68

John R. Morss, The Riddle of the Sands, in CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 53, 72.
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